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ARTICLE
GERMANY’S YESTERDAY IS CUBA’S TOMORROW:
COMPARING THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIZATION TO
THE CUBAN TRANSFORMATION
Kayla M. Bramnick†
ABSTRACT
For the last fifty years, the effects of communism have taken their toll on the
island of Cuba. The United States responded aggressively to the communist
takeover by severing its relationship with and sanctioning Cuba. These
sanctions have failed their purpose of punishing the communist regime for
violating fundamental human rights. Instead, the sanctions have further
harmed Cuban nationals. The United States has a responsibility to lift the
embargo and allow travel and communication between the nationals in Cuba
and the exiles in America. Only when the Cuban nationals understand the
benefits of a free society and have the support of the free world will they be able
to stand up to the communist regime.
The process of democratization is a difficult one. Many European nations
have transitioned from communistic and socialistic systems to democracy.
Germany was a nation that experienced this transition. Germany’s experience,
however, was unique because half of the nation had already established a stable
democracy. West Germany was able to assist East Germany’s transition from
communism into a democratic state. Germany’s successes and failures provide
an excellent case study and comparison for Cuba’s democratization.
In December of 2014, President Obama declared a policy change focused on
building a new relationship with Cuba. These endeavors may prove to be
successful if they are gradually implemented. The United States would be
prudent to follow the German model and provide Cuban Americans with the
opportunity to assist their Cuban relatives in the quest for a free Cuba.

† J.D., Liberty University School of Law, 2015. This Comment is dedicated to my
parents, to whom I owe the credit for anything I achieve in life and for providing the
inspiration for this topic. Thanks are due to Professor Tory Lucas for his support and guidance
throughout this entire process. Finally, a very special thank you is due to Melanie Migliaccio,
Benjamin White, Melinda Brewer, and the entire staff of the 2015 Liberty Law Review.
Without their unfailing encouragements and unrivaled advice, this article would never have
seen the light of day.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Samuel Adams once opined, ‘‘Among the natural rights of the Colonists
are these: First, a right to life; Secondly, to liberty; Thirdly, to property;
together with the right to support and defend them in the best manner they
can.’’1 In the United States, some authors take the position that the right to
property is a fundamental human right.2 Enemies of freedom, however,
gravitate towards an oppressive ideology. One such ideology is communism.
‘‘[T]he theory of Communism may be summed up in one sentence: Abolish
all private property.’’3 The concept of property ownership is one of the most
fundamental issues in a political system. Governments rely on either one of
these two ideologies to either protect or deny their citizens these rights. A
government that expropriates the right to own property violates the
fundamental human rights of its citizens.
A certain mystique surrounds nations that abstain from developing
alongside progressing nations. Oftentimes, nations are unable to advance
culturally, technologically, or economically as a result of an oppressive
ideology. The Republic of Cuba is an example of a state that has been at a
cultural standstill since 1940 when communism encroached upon the Island.
Communist leaders denied citizens’ rights, including the right to own private
property. The Communist Party swiftly incapacitated Cubans’ attempts to
regain their freedom. Insurgents, as they were called, were promptly arrested,
tortured, and executed for daring to oppose the party line.4 The Islanders’
frustration with their immovable situation led to a mass exodus of Cubans
and a pandemic of discouragement and passivity amongst the Cubans who
could not escape.5
1. SAMUEL
ADAMS,
THE
RIGHTS
OF
THE
COLONISTS
(1772),
https://history.hanover.edu/texts/adamss.html.
2. Stuart Grider, A Proposal for the Marketization of Housing in Cuba: The Limited
Equity Housing Corporation ------ A New Form of Property, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 453,
479 (1996) (noting that the concept that the right to private property is a fundamental right is
‘‘evidenced by the implementation of restitution and compensation schemes in post-socialist
Eastern Europe and a 1974 position of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees’’
with regards to property expropriated in Uganda). Notably, Grider disagrees with the
proposition.
3. KARL MARX & FRIEDERICH ENGELS, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 23 (Paul M. Sweezy trans.,
1948).
4. Organización de Los Estados Americanos, Informe Sobre La Situacion De Los
Derechos Humanos En Cuba, COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS (April 7,
1967), http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Cuba67sp/indice.htm.
5. Cubans who left Cuba at the beginning of Castro’s era will hereinafter be referred to
as ‘‘exiles’’ and Cubans who stayed in Cuba will hereinafter be referred to as ‘‘nationals.’’
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A government only possesses the power granted to it by its citizens. When
a government breaks its promises or takes action that harms the public, the
people begin to doubt its legitimacy. In the early 1980s, President Reagan
announced a policy towards communist and socialist nations known as the
Reagan Doctrine. Under the Reagan Doctrine, if a nation’s people viewed
their government as illegitimate, then the United States conferred upon itself
a right to intervene on behalf of that nation’s people.6 The United States’
aggressive reaction to Castro’s takeover in many ways foreshadowed this
doctrine.
Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act,
otherwise known as the Helms-Burton Act.7 The Act proscribed trade,
communication, and travel between Cuba and the United States. These
embargos were not limited to the relationship between the United States and
Cuba, but rather extended to the entire international community.8 The
consequences of this Act were swift and concentrated on the Cuban people
rather than the Communist Party.9 As per the Act’s language, the United
States refused to lift these bans unless Cuba became a democracy.10 However,
the current social and economic status of Cuban nationals prevents them
from pressuring their government to change. The Cuban problem has
become a circular one and requires a different approach.
Eastern European countries have experience in evolving from oppressive
regimes to democratic methodologies. As a result of the fall of communism
and socialism in European countries, ‘‘the term ‘nationalization’ came to
stand for imprisonment: the suspension of national history, severance from
the world, poverty, loss of identity, and colonization . . . .’’11 Numerous
European nations embraced the Western view of freedom for all, which
includes, inter alia, the right to private property.12 Embracing private

6. The ‘‘Reagan Doctrine’’ Is Announced, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/the-reagan-doctrine-is-announced.
7. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091
[hereinafter ‘‘Helms-Burton Act’’].
8. Id. at § 6032.
9. Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddling with Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 575, 595 (1997).
10. Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.C.S. § 6022(1), (4).
11. Anna Gelpern, The Laws and Politics of Reprivatization in East-Central Europe: A
Comparison, 14 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 315, 370 (1993).
12. Jon Mills & Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Whither Communism: A Comparative Perspective
on Constitutionalism in a Postsocialist Cuba, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1219, 1234 (2009).
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property rights is a fundamental tenet for any fledgling economy.13 The
various Eastern European transitions furnish a multitude of rich case studies
that provide guidance for a post-communist Cuba.14 Germany successfully
transitioned15 from a controlled economy to a free-market society.16 This
Article examines the potential Cuban response to its current governmental
failure and to its potential democratization by analyzing the East German
response as it transitioned to democracy. This Article will also analyze the
various processes Cuba may utilize to restore expropriated property to its
citizens.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Cuba
In the early 1800s, Cuba was under the ruthless control of Spanish
colonials.17 In 1868, the Cuban people united against the Spaniards and
drafted the Cuban Declaration of Independence.18 In this document, the
emerging leadership ‘‘recognized the natural rights of all peoples and viewed
slavery as incompatible with this principle.’’19
The United States supported Cuba’s attempts for independence, and
freedom was attained in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War.20
Spain signed the Treaty of Paris relinquishing the Island to the United States.
For the next three years, the United States played an active role in molding
13. See Robert E. Freer, Jr., The Significance of Restitution in the Economic Recovery of
Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. 185, 188 (1995).
14. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1234.
15. For the purposes of this article, the term ‘‘transition’’ will refer to Cuba’s future
democratization from communism.
16. Heather M. Stack, The ‘‘Colonization’’ of East Germany?: A Comparative Analysis of
German Privatization, 46 DUKE L.J. 1211, 1212 (1997); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Stephan M.
Bleisteiner, Some Lessons for Cuba from the Legal Changes in Eastern Europe, 3 U. MIAMI Y.B.
INT’L L. 173, 178 (1995). Other nations that successfully transitioned from communism
include Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Id.
17. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1223.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. FLORIDA CENTER FOR INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY, Spanish-American War for Cuba’s
Independence, EXPLORING FLORIDA (2002), http://fcit.usf.edu/florida/lessons/s-a_war/sa_war1.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). ‘‘The United States declared war on Spain after a U.S.
warship exploded and sank on February 15, 1898. The Spanish-American war ended when
Spain signed a treaty giving the United States control over Cuba [and other Caribbean
islands].’’ Id.
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Cuba’s future.21 In 1901, Cuba enacted its first constitution.22 The
Constitución de la Republica de Cuba recognized the right to property as
fundamental.23 Article 32 of the Cuban Constitution mandated that ‘‘no
person could be deprived of property without a valid public purpose and due
compensation.’’24 On May 20, 1902, Cuba declared its sole sovereignty and
separation from the United States.25 In spite of Cuba’s claim to sovereignty,
however, the United States retained the right to intervene on Cuba’s behalf
in order to preserve its newfound independence.26
1. The Batista dictatorship
During the next forty years, Cuba failed to achieve a free democracy.
Disputed elections in 1906 and 1924, as well as the United States’ constant
intervention, caused several revolts.27 In September 1933, Fulgencia Batista
led a revolt, overthrowing the fledgling democracy. In 1940, Cuban
legislators adopted a new constitution.28 The legislators of this revised
constitution confirmed the original idea of owning property as a natural
right.29 The legislators ratified Article 24, which stated that a government
taking of private property would have to be for just cause and required that
any individual whose property was taken by the government be
compensated.30 This constitution was ‘‘a model for many Latin American
constitutions,’’ because it also ‘‘guaranteed the rights to employment and
collective bargaining and established a minimum wage, maximum work

21. Id.
22. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1224. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA
[CONSTITUTION] Feb. 21, 1901, translated in British and Foreign State Papers 1900-1901, at
554 (Augustus H. Oakes & Willoughby Maycock eds., 1904).
23. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1224. ‘‘All countries in Eastern Europe have
acknowledged the fundamental right of private entities, domestic and foreign, to own property
and they have provided legal protection to private property rights.’’ Travieso-Diaz &
Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 187.
24. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1224.
25. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 580.
26. Id.
27. SERGIO DIAZ-BRIQUETS & JORGE PÉREZ-LÓPEZ, CORRUPTION IN CUBA: CASTRO AND
BEYOND 63 (University of Texas Press 2006).
28. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1224-25. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE
CUBA [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 21, 1901, arts. 24, 87, translated in 1 Constitutions of Nations 610,
614, 626 (Amos J. Peaslee ed., 2d ed. 1956).
29. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1224-25.
30. Id.
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week, [and] maternity leave . . . .’’31 The Constitution of 1940 is commonly
viewed by Cuban exiles as ‘‘the last legitimate expression of the constitutional
will of the Cuban people . . . .’’32
During this tumultuous time, Batista, a formidable figure, governed the
Island. His first ‘‘term’’ in office was properly procured through a democratic
vote.33 After the end of his term, Batista continued to dominate Cuban
politics for the next twenty-five years by controlling the presidents
throughout that time.34 In 1952, however, Batista staged a coup, repealed the
1940 constitution, and illegally enthroned himself as Cuba’s dictator.35
Batista’s regime was corrupt.36 Bribery was the method by which Cubans
accomplished anything.37 Poverty was a major problem and the middle class
was kept small as a result of vast unemployment.38 The restrictions of
freedoms and the declining economy provoked frustration among the
people.
2. Castro’s Communism
a. Fidel Castro: The Communist Dictator
In 1959, a young Fidel Castro led the people’s revolt against Batista’s
dictatorship.39 Castro promised freedom and equal opportunities for all and
successfully overturned Batista’s governance.40 Castro’s administration
enacted the Fundamental Law in the same year.41 This law reestablished
Article 24 from the 1940 Constitution, thus affirming the government’s
commitment to private property.42 In contravention of the promises of
31. Grider, supra note 2, at 480-81.
32. Daniel A. Espino, Step-Down Restitution: A Proposal for an Equitable Resolution to
Confiscated Cuban Property, 32 NOVA L. REV. 423, 429 (2008) (citation omitted).
33. Steven E. Hendrix, Tensions in Cuban Property Law, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1996).
HISTORYOFCUBA.COM,
34. Jerry
A.
Sierra,
Batista,
http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/batista.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
35. Interview with Carlos Feldman, Cuban Exile, in Miami, Florida (Dec. 21, 2014).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. José Patiño Girona, After 50 years, Cuban Expats Recall Broken Promises Of Castro,
THE
TAMPA
TRIBUNE
(May
22,
2013,
1:23
PM),
http://tbo.com/special_section/history/2008/dec/26/after-50-years-cuban-expatriates-recallbroken-pro-ar-111594/.
40. Id.
41. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1226.
42. Id.
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freedom, the bigger-than-life dictator launched a fifty-year reign of economic
devastation.43 Due to his Marxist/Leninist political ideology, Fidel established
an agenda for nationalization of all private property.44 In July of 1960, Fidel
seized all United States property and Cuban businesses.45 Three months later,
the Urban Reform Law ‘‘eliminated private sale and rental of homes,
transferred property to homeless Cuban citizens, canceled mortgages, and
made all rent and mortgage payments payable to the state.’’46 Cuban law
developed double standards with regards to small businesses.47 Individuals
were restricted from forming corporations, although they were allowed to
operate certain small enterprises.48 Additionally, Cubans were allowed to sell
their houses or cars to other Cubans, but ‘‘local bank loans [were] limited.’’49
The only way to succeed in Cuba was to have connections with Castro’s
administration.50
As a result of the turmoil, some Cubans began to seek refuge in the United
States while others attempted in vain to depose his government. Cuban exiles
endeavored to defeat Fidel in the Bay of Pigs invasion.51 The exiles, however,
failed miserably. While some exiles escaped, the rest were either killed or
captured by Castro’s forces.52 The regime responded to these acts of rebellion
by ‘‘systematically depriv[ing the people] of their fundamental rights to free
expression, privacy, association, assembly, movement and due process of

43. Girona, supra note 39.
44. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1232. ‘‘The first nationalizations targeted the
property of former officials in the Batista regime.’’ Id. at 1231-32. However, the subsequent
waves of nationalizations were targeted towards private citizens. Id. at 1232.
45. Id.
46. Espino, supra note 32, at 430.
47. See generally Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1232-33. This was largely focused on
the Cuban agriculture industry.
48. Id. at 1232 n.84.
49. Id.; Cuba’s Legal Composite A Blend of the Familiar and the Foreign, BENCH & B.
MINN., (Jan. 11, 2012), http://mnbenchbar.com/2012/01/cubas-legal-composite/.
50. Interview with Carlos Feldman, supra note 35, at 1.
51. Bay of Pigs Invasion, HISTORY CHANNEL (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/coldwar/bay-of-pigs-invasion (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). After Fidel Castro took over, ‘‘officials
at the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) attempted to push
Castro from power . . . . [I]n April 1961, the CIA launched . . . a full-scale invasion of Cuba by
sending 1,400 American-trained Cubans who had fled their homes when Castro took over.’’
Id. Nevertheless, the invasion was not successful because ‘‘[t]he invaders were badly
outnumbered by Castro’s troops, and they surrendered after less than 24 hours of fighting.’’
Id.
52. Id.
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law.’’53 Cuban nationals who rebelled were detained, imprisoned, tortured,
and executed.54
Fidel used tactics such as police warnings, surveillance, and ‘‘politically
motivated dismissals from employment’’ to coerce obedience.55 Speech was
limited to government propaganda. The regime used constant surveillance to
inhibit any dissent from the government.56 Mobile phones and computers
were off limits to the average person. Television and radio programs were
strictly monitored in order to promote the government’s message among the
people. Insurgents were either imprisoned or murdered.57 Journalists were
arrested because of their ‘‘work activities’’ in Cuba.58 Since 1990, minimum
wage has dropped to the equivalent of three dollars per month and
productivity has dropped forty-five percent.59
In keeping with the socialistic ideology, Castro’s administration provided
a variety of social entitlements to his people.60 These included free health care,
day care for children, public education, low priced but strictly portioned food
and clothing, low-cost housing and transportation, and free or low-cost
access to sports and recreation.61 Such entitlements created a dispirited
society that passively permitted the abuse of governmental power.62
b. The Global Response
The international backlash to Fidel’s takeover of Cuba was swift and
jarring. The United States severed its diplomatic relations with Cuba.63
Cuba’s dependence on the Soviet Union dissolved when Russia suffered its

53. Cuba: Fidel Castro’s Abusive Machinery Remains Intact, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb.
18. 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/02/18/cuba-fidel-castro-s-abusive-machineryremains-intact.
54. See Organización de Los Estados Americanos, supra note 4.
55. Cuba: Fidel Castro’s Abusive Machinery Remains Intact, supra note 53.
56. Grider, supra note 2, at 461.
57. See Organización de los Estados Americanos, supra note 4.
58. Cuba’s Legal Composite A Blend of the Familiar and the Foreign, supra note 49.
59. John P. Sweeney, Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should be Maintained, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (Nov. 10, 1994), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1994/11/bg1010nbspwhy-the-cuban-trade.
60. See Profile: Raul Castro, BBC WORLD NEWS (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-12700491. Raúl observed that, ‘‘[m]any
Cubans confuse socialism with freebies and subsidies, and equality with egalitarianism.’’ Id.
61. Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 187 n.20.
62. See id.
63. Grider, supra note 2, at 462.
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own economic collapse.64 By mid-1993, the Cuban economy suffered such a
deep depression that Cubans were restricted to eating one and one-half to
two meals a day.65 In 1996, a Cuban military aircraft shot down two unarmed
United States civilian aircraft, resulting in the deaths of three United States
citizens and one permanent resident.66 The United States responded by
codifying a trade embargo against Cuba.67
(1) The Reagan Doctrine: The United States’ Right to Intervene
One of the dangers facing a transitioning nation occurs when the
government faces questions of legitimacy from its citizens.68 Former
President Reagan supported the notion that the United States should be able
to provide economic and military support to rebels combating undemocratic
governments.69 The Reagan Doctrine contended that defining a legitimate
government ‘‘depends on the consent of the governed’’ and on its respect for
the rights of citizens.70 The purpose of the United States’ aggressiveness was
to show that communism was not invincible.71 Reagan’s goal was to ‘‘shatter
the Marxist-Leninist myth of the irreversibility of proletarian revolution by
helping anti-communist forces challenge the legitimacy of the totalitarian
regimes.’’72 According to the Reagan Doctrine, legitimacy is the foremost
predictor of the success of a nation’s constitution-making process.73 While a
nation-state may have characteristics of illegitimacy, it is not officially
deemed so until that nation’s people doubt its legitimacy. ‘‘[T]he people of a
country might perceive the policies of a government, the government itself,
or even the entire state as illegitimate.’’74
64. See Dhooge, supra note 9, at 587.
65. Grider, supra note 2, at 463-64.
66. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 575.
67. Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6032 (1996).
68. See generally Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy Revisited: ‘Pro-Democratic’
Armed Intervention in the Post-Bipolar World, 3 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 481, 486
(1993).
69. David P. Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought; the Use of Force in the Reagan Years, 11
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 45, 105 (1994).
70. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and
International Law, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 19, 20-21
(Council on Foreign Relations ed., 2d ed. 1991).
71. Robert Tucker, Reagan’s Foreign Policy, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 13-14 (1989); see generally
JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, LEGITIMACY AND FORCE 391-93 (Transaction Books 1989).
72. Fidler, supra note 69, at 105.
73. Roth, supra note 68, at 486; see also Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1236.
74. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1236.
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The communist parties of European nations such as Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, and Hungary lost a level of legitimacy in the
eyes of their people.75 Demonstrations were held on the streets of Warsaw,
Riga, Prague, and Budapest as a result of the public’s revulsion towards
government control of the constitution-drafting processes.76 The Reagan
Doctrine provided the United States with various avenues for opposing
illegitimate regimes. It permitted the United States to sanction governments
that lacked ‘‘consent of the governed and depended on external supplies of
armaments to maintain themselves in power.’’77
Cuban citizens struggled with skepticism towards both the Communist
Party and the Island’s oppressive government. Cubans never doubted the
legitimacy of their state because ‘‘the Cuban revolution was not imposed by
a foreign power; rather . . . [by] a phenomenon primarily conducted by
Cubans.’’78 Cuban exiles view Castro’s Communist Party with great
skepticism.79 This is similar to the skepticism experienced by citizens of
Germany.80 Castro’s communism was an ‘‘organic’’ public movement that
began as a result of Cubans’ frustration with Batista’s dictatorship. Although
Cuba recognized at least fifty opposition groups in the early 1990s, ‘‘political
75. See id.; Michael L. Neff, Eastern Europe’s Policy of Restitution of Property in the 1990s,
10 DICK. J. INT’L L. 357 (1992).
76. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1236.
77. Roth, supra note 68, at 485 (emphasis omitted).
78. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1256. Latvia’s people doubted the legitimacy of
their state when, at the end of World War II, Latvia was subjected to the terror of socialism.
Mass demonstrations became commonplace and the Soviet regime refused to respond. Id. at
1240. ‘‘[T]he illegitimacy of the state became the constitution drafter’s biggest opportunity:
establishing a distinct identity of an independent Latvia and, through that, political
legitimacy.’’ Id.
79. See Interview with Rigoberto Sotolongo, Cuban Exile, in Miami, Fla. (Dec. 21, 2014).
80. See John Feffer, The Costs of German Reunification, THE WORLD POST (Nov. 12, 2014), http:
//www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/the-costs-of-german-reuni_b_6144764.html. Skepticism
towards a socialist party was also present in parts of Europe such as Czechoslovakia. Mills &
Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1245-46. In 1948, Czechoslovakia’s democratic government was
superseded by a Stalinized system. Id. When the nation nationalized of property, a ‘‘cathartic
revulsion’’ was triggered and the citizens perceived the Communist Party as illegitimate. Id. The
people mobilized protests against the government believing that a new constitution would restore
their rights. Id. at 1249. Eventually the Communistic government surrendered to the will of the
people. Id. at 1247-48. Unlike the people of Czechoslovakia, the people of Poland perceived the
Communist Party’s role in the state as illegitimate. Id. at 1241. Poland allowed other political parties
to be legally established even though the elections were rigged to ‘‘maintain[] . . . political
supremacy.’’ Id. at 1244. After various protests the government finally implemented political
reforms of ‘‘pluralism and capitalism usher[ing] Polish communism into the chronicles of history
with a stroke of a pen.’’ Id. at 1244.
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activity outside officially-sanctioned channels has met consistent and fierce
repression, including harassment, arrest, imprisonment, torture, executions,
and targeted assassinations.’’81
(2) Helms-Burton Act: The United States Response to Cuba
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Helms-Burton Act into law.82
The purpose of the Act was to strengthen sanctions against Fidel’s regime, to
support the initiation of a democratic process on the Island, to protect the
United States from acts of Cuban terrorism, and to protect United States
nationals from confiscation of property by the Castro administration.83 The
Act, in essence, prevents the United States, or its allies, from fostering
relationships with Cuba until its government meets certain criteria. The
language of the Helms-Burton Act demands that Cuba must begin accepting
democratic policies, evidenced by a transitional government, before the
United States will restore its relationship with the Island.
The combination of the United States embargo, the termination of
subsidies from Russia, and the sharp decline in export trade as a result of the
collapse of the Soviet Union severely affected the Cuban economy.84 ‘‘Cuban
nationals were asked to leave their manufacturing and office jobs to
81. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1258. In 1995, the Concilio Cubano (Cuban
Council) was composed of a coalition of 140 unofficial dissident groups. However, the Cuban
government shut down the council.
If Cuba’s future leadership creates channels permitting dissenting opinions to play an
influential role in Cuban politics, then the next step would be to see whether the ‘‘reform comes
from within or outside the party.’’ However, if such reform is triggered from outside the party,
it becomes problematic because the nationals will view their own constitutional framework as
illegitimate.
Another possibility is that Cuban nationals may perceive the policies of the regime as
illegitimate, rather than the party itself. This is similar to the crisis in Hungary. ‘‘[D]issension
[in Hungary] could be manifested within the party ranks, which allowed opposition to
manifest within the government in addition to external to it.’’ Id. at 1255. The crisis of
legitimacy was limited to the policies of the Communist Party, thus resolution for Hungarians
was easier in juxtaposition to other nations. The Hungarian government in the 1940s even
allowed an opposition movement within the party, which allowed the dissenting party to
maintain itself as a legitimate political party. Adopting a Hungarian model would require the
Cuban leadership to amend the 1922 Constitution to ‘‘accommodate new political pluralism
while remaining in force under a democratic Cuba.’’ Id. at 1259. This amendment would allow
a healthy and legitimate dissent to form within the party.
82. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 575. This statute was named after the two legislators who
introduced it, United States Senator Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina) and United
States Representative Dan Burton (Republican, Indiana).
83. Id. at 576.
84. See generally Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12.
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‘volunteer’ in the fields.’’85 Unemployment rapidly became customary and
rationing was introduced for such commodities and services as food, fuel,
and electricity.86 Droves of Cubans immigrated to the United States and other
nations to escape the corruption and injustice. For many unable to escape,
life under Communism was unbearable, evidenced by the fact that ‘‘Cuba has
one of the highest suicide rates in the Americas.’’87
c. Raúl Castro: The Brother of the Dictator
In 2006, after forty-seven years of uninterrupted governance, Fidel
underwent surgery and temporarily delegated his authority to his brother
Raúl.88 Two years later, Fidel resigned from office as President of the Council
of State and Commander in Chief of Cuba.89 In 2011, Fidel resigned all of his
state and political positions and never attempted to regain power.90 In the
same year, Cuba’s Communist Party elected Raúl to succeed Fidel as head of
the country’s highest political body and only legal party.91 Raúl introduced
several significant changes.92 He ‘‘allowed unused state-owned land to pass
over to private farmers and cooperatives in an attempt to boost domestic food
production.’’93 The effects of these changes were evidenced in the distinct rise
in salaries and state pensions.94
Further, Raúl expressed the concern that ‘‘[m]any Cubans confuse
socialism with freebies and subsidies, and equality with egalitarianism.’’95 In
2010, the administration began to reassess the Island’s governmental
structure and considered moving towards a model that allows for private
commerce.96 A component of this process included the government’s plan to
‘‘reduce the size of the state.’’97 Unfortunately, Raúl has not been able to
85. Grider, supra note 2, at 463-64.
86. Id.
87. Andres Oppenheimer, After 50 Years, Cuba Has Little To Show, MIAMI HERALD (Dec.
12,
2008),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andresoppenheimer/article1930846.html.
88. Raul Castro Fast Facts, CNN WORLD NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015, 12:25 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/13/world/americas/raul-castro---fast-facts/.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Profile: Raul Castro, supra note 60.
93. Id. Recently, Raúl also relaxed restrictions to own mobile phones and computers. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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substantially advance these objectives because the economy has steadily and
substantially declined.
In comparison with people of other Latin American countries, Cubans
have a low per capita income. ‘‘[Cubans] have fewer television sets,
telephones, computers and cars relative to their population than most Latin
American countries, and the lowest percentage of people with access to the
Internet in the region, even below Haiti.’’98 The U.N. Human Development
Report ‘‘lists the island’s per capita income at $6,000 a year.’’99 Cuba’s current
gross domestic product (‘‘GDP’’) is somewhere between Haiti’s and
Nicaragua’s.100 ‘‘1.8 million pensioners [received] an average of $10 a month,
equal to about three percent of the GDP.’’101 Currently, Cuba’s trade deficit
stands in excess of one and one half billion dollars annually.102
As a result of the Island’s recent economic downfall, the government has
truncated the entitlements originally promised to the Cuban nationals.103
Additionally, the Island has been unable to service its thirteen billion dollar
debt to Western creditors.104
In the midst of the despair and darkness, there is a glimmer of hope for
the Cuban people. In April 2011, Raúl Castro opened the Communist Party
congress with a declaration that ‘‘leaders should be limited to two five-year
terms in office.’’105 Two years later, in February 2013, Raúl was re-elected to
a second five-year term.106 Later, ‘‘[d]uring a nationally televised speech,
Castro announce[d] that he will step down from power in 2018 when his term
is over.’’107 Commentators on Raúl’s shocking speech mentioned that he
‘‘hinted at other changes to the constitution, some so dramatic that they will
98. Oppenheimer, supra note 87.
99. Id.
100. Grider, supra note 2, at 462-63. The real per capita GDP of Cuba is only $2,000 per
year. Id. at 462. ‘‘In 1958, Cuba ranked third in Latin America, behind only Argentina and
Venezuela, in [Gross National Product]. Today, Cuba ranks in the bottom quintile of GNP in
Latin America.’’ Id. at 462-63.
101. Juan O. Tamayo, Poverty in Cuba increases as government slashes social spending,
expert says, THE MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.cubaverdad.net/weblog
/2014/02/poverty-in-cuba-increases-as-government-slashes-social-spending-expert-says/. A
gross domestic product measures the level of prices of goods and services in an economy.
102. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 588.
103. Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 187 n.20.
104. Marc Frank, Cuba Inches Toward Transparency, Seeking Investment and Credit, THE
CUBAN ECONOMY (Dec. 24, 2014), http://thecubaneconomy.com/articles/tag/external-debt/.
105. Raul Castro Fast Facts, supra note 88.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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have to be ratified by the Cuban people in a referendum.’’108 ‘‘The inevitable
end to Cuban caudillismo109 . . . and a corresponding change in Cuba’s
international political and economic relations may usher in a new era of
Cuban constitutionalism.’’110 Cuba’s relationship with the United States
continues to be precarious.111 Until recently, the United States government
refused to engage with the Cuban government under the leadership of Fidel
or Raúl Castro.112 As for the people’s legitimacy crisis, analysts await Raúl’s
response.113 The Cuban government has permitted neither a dissenting group
to form nor a strong civil society to coalesce, independent from the state or
the party.114 Most likely, the Cuban government has proscribed opposition
movements because otherwise a new constitutional system would have to be
developed.115

108. Cuba’s Raul Castro Announces Retirement in 5 Years, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2013,
12:09
AM),
www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/02/24/cuba-president-castroparliament/1943365. See also Hannah Allam, Even if Raul Castro steps down in 2018, U.S.Cuba
relations
may
not
thaw,
MCCLATCHYDC
(Feb.
25,
2013),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24745387.html. (‘‘The Castro
brothers know by now that such moves also play well in the United States, where they just got
a public relations boost with the remarks of a U.S. senator who led a delegation to Cuba this
month to seek the release of Alan Gross, an American imprisoned on the island for illegally
importing communications equipment while on a USAID-funded democracy-building
program.’’).
109. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1234. In this context, the term ‘‘caudillismo’’ refers
to the cult of personality of the political-military leader Fidel Castro.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1264.
112. Id. Current developments will be discussed later in this comment. See Section III.C.
113. Id. at 1266. Some constitutional analysts anticipate that in the future, Cuba will choose
not to reenact the 1901 or 1940 constitutions. Both constitutions guarantee ‘‘the right to
possess property, without government interference.’’ Id. at 1266. Re-enacting these particular
constitutions would not be sufficient to legitimize the government. However, ‘‘if a crisis of
legitimacy is focused on Castro’s Communist Party rather than the state itself,’’ it is then
foreseeable that Cuba will ‘‘adopt an entirely new document.’’ Id.
114. Id. If Castro’s party responds to the skepticism by permitting a ‘‘limited political
pluralism,’’ then the Cuban leadership would have the opportunity to amend the 1976
Constitution and restore protections for property, political, and civil rights. Similar
proceedings were successful in Hungary. Id. at 1267.
115. A healthy internal opposition will encourage private ownership, domestic
entrepreneurship, and foreign investment.
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3. Is the Cuban Culture Worth Saving?
The poet T.S. Eliot once described culture as ‘‘that which makes life worth
living.’’116 The Cuban culture is no exception. Cuban culture is rich with
history, diversity, and luscious traditions, from the distinct salsa music to the
delicious Hispanic cuisine. Cubans are a conglomeration of individuals from
Spanish, African, French, Asian, and Jewish cultures and are known for their
lively and excitable personalities.117 Education and hard work have always
been critical aspects of the Cuban lifestyle. Cubans who have immigrated to
the United States have experienced success and security as a result of their
work ethic. Economically, Cubans enjoy greater security than other Hispanic
groups in the United States.118
Currently, Cuban Americans play an influential role in American culture,
especially in the political sphere.119 One reason for the fierce level of political
engagement is that many former members of the Cuban government
immigrated to the United States.120 Another reason Cubans participate
heavily in American politics is because they understand that ‘‘politics is a
tangible thing that has real and deep consequences.’’121 ‘‘The driving
ideological force behind most Cuban American political activity has been
opposition to the Marxist regime in Cuba.’’122 In 1990, seventy-eight percent
116. THOMAS S. ELIOT, NOTES TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF CULTURE 26 (1948).
117. Culture
and
Traditions,
CUBAINFO.DE,
http://www.cubainfo.de/mainnavigation/country-society/culture-and-traditions.html?L=1 (last visited Nov. 21, 2015);
Rebecca
Weiner,
Cuba,
JEWISH
VIRTUAL
LIBRARY,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/Cuba.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2015).
118. Sean Buffington, Cuban Americans, COUNTRIES AND THEIR CULTURES,
http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Bu-Dr/Cuban-Americans.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2015) (‘‘In 1986, the median family income of Cuban Americans was $26,770----- $2,700 less
than the median for all U.S. family incomes but $6,700 more than the median for all Hispanic
American family incomes. Cuban Americans are also highly educated; fully 17 percent of the
Cuban American population has completed college or college and some graduate schooling,
compared with eight percent of Puerto Ricans, six percent of Mexican Americans, and 20
percent of the total U.S. population.’’).
119. Id.
120. Fernand R. Amandi, A History of Political Organization for Cuban-Americans, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Aug. 1, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/01/cubanamericans-political-success/a-history-of-political-organization-for-cuban-americans (arguing
that the entire Cuban political class left Cuba and came to the United States).
121. Lisa Garcia Bedolla, Cuban-Americans Have an Appreciation for Political Argument, THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Feb.
3,
2014,
12:53
PM)
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/01/cuban-americans-political-success/cubanamericans-have-an-appreciation-for-political-argument.
122. Buffington, supra note 118.
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of Cuban Americans were registered to vote. Studies show that Cubans
overwhelmingly vote for the Republican Party as a result of their conservative
views.123 Cubans recognize that the United States plays a pivotal role in
Cuba’s prospective democratization. In addition to the political involvement,
Cubans have made distinct contributions to the fields of academia, medicine,
business, science, arts, sports, and music.
Unlike cultures that encourage independence or private personalities,
Cubans have a reputation for being lively and boisterous.124 It is customary
to spot Cubans socializing around the domino table, smoking cigars,
drinking Cuban coffee, and discussing politics.125 Freedom is an essential
element of the Cuban way of life. Thus, when the people lost their rights to
life and property they felt compelled to leave their beloved homeland.126 As a
result of the forced exodus, there is a widespread desire, among the exiles, for
the opportunity to return and recreate a free Cuba.127 However, these same
individuals refuse to return until the government makes some permanent
changes. Rigoberto Sotolongo and his son José escaped from Cuba twentytwo years ago solely to procure the freedom and opportunities they could
never receive under Castro’s communism.128 Both men disclosed that they
would not return to their homeland until the ‘‘current corrupt government .
. . [is] removed’’ and democracy is established.129

123. Id.
124. Rita de Zayas, The Origin of Dominoes and its Introduction in Cuba, CUBA HERITAGE
http://www.cubaheritage.org/articles.asp?lID=1&artID=65 (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
125. See id. ‘‘In times of economic hardships, this game was a resort used for entertainment
to compensate for hard work and a way to forget economical problems. The preference for
dominoes could have been influenced by the mild climate of the island and the open
personality of Cubans.’’ Id.
126. See Amandi, supra note 120.
127. Portia Siegelbaum, Cuban-Americans Going Home for Christmas, CBS NEWS (Dec. 23,
2011, 11:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cuban-americans-going-home-forchristmas/. This is evidenced by the large number of Cuban exiles that return to the Island
during the holiday season. In 1996, travel restrictions between the two nations were relaxed
and in 2011 there were approximately 29 flights from the United States to Havana, Cuba in
one day. Id.
128. Sotolongo Interview, supra note 79, at 1.
129. Id.
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B. Germany
1. The Hitler Era
Like Cuba, Germany also endeavored to establish a free government but
faced overwhelming barriers. In the 1920s, Germany was a republic.130
However, by 1932 the German Nazi party controlled Germany’s
parliament.131 One year later, Adolph Hitler was appointed as Chancellor of
the nation.132 Like Castro’s regime, Hitler introduced a reign of unbridled
control and eventual terror.
Hitler began his reign of terror by enacting laws that effectively stripped
rights from certain groups of people.133 Like in Cuba, the Nazis began by
expropriating Jewish businesses.134 Jewish people were stripped of all
property rights.135 Eventually, this injustice led to the ‘‘Wannsee
Conference.’’136 High-ranking Nazi leaders and German government officials
met to discuss and formulate policies to answer the ‘‘Jewish Question.’’137 The
Nazis coined their answer to this question as the ‘‘Final Solution.’’138 The

130. The Weimar Republic, FACTS ABOUT GERMANY, http://www.tatsachen-ueberdeutschland.de/en/history/main-content-03/1919-1933-the-weimar-republic.html
(last
visited Nov. 21, 2015).
131. Kez U. Gabriel, The Idealist Discourse of Legal Professionalism in Maryland:
Delineating the Omissions and Eloquent Silences As A Progressive Critique, 41 U. BALT. L.F.
120, 140 n.93 (2011). ‘‘Nazi’’ is a contraction used to represent the National Socialist German
Workers’ Party.
HISTORY
PLACE,
132. World
War
II
in
Europe,
THE
http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/timeline/ww2time.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
In his quest to rule the world, Hitler’s Nazis invaded and annexed the following territories:
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, France Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Greece, Yugoslavia, Minsk, portions of Russia, and Italy. Id.
133. Gabriel, supra note 131, at 149 n.93. These laws famously known as the Nuremberg
Laws of 1933 articulated the Nazis’ ‘‘longer-term goal of promoting Nordic or Aryan racial
purity, galvanizing the distressed German economy, and restoring the historic glory of both
the German military and German territorial polity.’’ Id.
134. Jewish Property Seizures, ALPHA HISTORY, http://alphahistory.com/holocaust/jewishproperty-seizures/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
135. Id.
136. Wannsee Conference and the ‘‘Final Solution,’’ HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005477 (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
137. LUCY DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS, 1933-1945 xiii-xv (New York, 1975).
The term ‘‘Jewish Question’’ has historically been used to characterize attitudes of antiSemitism. Id. at xiv.
138. Id. at xiv.
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implementation of this ‘‘solution’’ resulted in the massacre of millions of
innocent men, women, and children.139
The fact that the government and the nation were driven by an immoral
creed does not automatically suggest that the Nazi regime was illegitimate.140
At that point in time, German citizens were desperate to follow someone who
would promote change. They believed in Adolph Hitler; they believed in the
Nazi doctrine and were willing to follow his lead.141 While the western world
was shocked at the consequences of a nation led by Nazism, the Germans, as
a whole, trusted their leader and his ideas. They did not view Nazism as
illegitimate or doubt Hitler’s authority.142
2. Life After Hitler
Nazism reigned in Germany until May 1945, when German armed forces
were compelled to surrender.143 The nation was partitioned into four military
occupation zones.144 The United States, France, and the United Kingdom
controlled the western zones, and the Soviet Union had jurisdiction over the
eastern zone.145 By 1949, the western zones merged to form the Federal
Republic of Germany (‘‘West Germany’’).146 The eastern zone became the
German Democratic Republic (‘‘East Germany’’).147 The division between the
people of West and East Germany was similar to the division between the
Cuban exiles and nationals. Like the Cuban exiles in the United States, West
Germany fully embraced the democratic system of its benefactor nations.148

139. Stig Hornshoj-Moller, Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag of January 30, 1939, THE
HOLOCAUST HISTORY PROJECT (Oct. 24, 1998).
140. Aditi Bagchi, Intention, Torture, and the Concept of State Crime, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
1, 24 (2009) (‘‘[I]nasmuch as popular support or consent is seen as the basis for legitimacy
without any reference to the institutions or policies which are supported, bad governments
supported by morally corrupt societies would be deemed ‘legitimate.’ We could not condemn
as illegitimate brutal popular governments, such as Nazi Germany, which are ruthless and
cruel but not necessarily perceived as such within the society governed.’’).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See generally RICHARD J. EVANS, THE COMING OF THE THIRD REICH (New York:
Penguin 2003).
144. Rainer Frank, Privatization in Eastern Germany: A Comprehensive Study, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 809, 812 (1994).
145. See id.
146. Stack, supra note 16, at 1215.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1249-50.
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Conversely, similarly to the Cuban nationals, East Germany followed a
trajectory leading the nation from Nazi fascism to Russian communism.149
a. The Communization of East Germany
In 1952, East Germany passed a law providing for the dispossession of
property for alleged misdemeanors and felonies.150 Eventually, that law
transmogrified into ‘‘the transformation of private property into socialist
property of a cooperative in which the original holders held nothing more
than titular ownership.’’151 This transmogrification was based on the ideology
that property was best preserved for the collective good.152 This same ideology
has perpetuated Cuban life throughout the Castro regime.
As the concept of private property is non-existent under a communist
ideology, Communism had a devastating effect on East Germany. ‘‘Life under
a communist system changed the East Germans. . . . [as] they lived under a
different set of laws, with a different social system, a pattern of political
oppression, a struggling economy, and a low standard of living.’’153
Unemployment soared and restitution of property claims plummeted.154 East
Germans experienced a violation of a fundamental right, as they could not
own property. East Germany’s economic downturn, as a result of
communism, resembled Cuba’s experience. The East Germans’ frustration
with the economic stress and infringement of liberties led to the eventual
crumbling of the regime along with the Berlin Wall in 1989 when the two
nations were unified.155 However, forty-five years of separation vastly
changed the personalities of the two nations, and this caused conflicts
between the two identities.156
b. The Democratization of the Re-Unified Germany
The treaties binding West and East Germany established a democratic
form of government.157 The ‘‘marriage’’ between these two nations protected
the newly formed nation from serious danger to its democracy and
149. See Dorothy Ames Jeffress, Note, Resolving Rival Claims on East German Property
Upon German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527, 530 (1991).
150. Frank, supra note 144, at 815.
151. Id.
152. Jeffress, supra note 149, at 527. The concept of State controlled property was
commonly known as Volkseigentum. Id.
153. See Stack, supra note 16, at 1249-50.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1215.
156. Id. at 1249.
157. Id. at 1212.
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economy.158 ‘‘East Germany had the unique advantage of [merging] with [its]
western counterpart’’ which could support its transition from communism
to democracy, unlike other countries in Eastern Europe.159 West Germany
had already developed a strong market economy, a robust democratic
government, a solid relationship with the Western world, and still had a
history, personality, and culture identical to that of East Germany. Nations
such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Latvia transitioned from socialism to a
democratic state without that support.160 Similarly, Cuba has the opportunity
to follow Germany’s lead since a large percentage of Cubans currently live in
a democratic society. Instead of two nations merging, Cuban exiles could be
allowed to return to the Island, and they would be in a position to assist the
Cuban nationals in transitioning from communism to democracy.
Unfortunately, even years after the reunification, a ‘‘deep economic and
emotional divide between east and west’’ remained.161 East Germans
struggled to trust the representative process that was so quickly thrust upon
them.162 ‘‘[T]he reunification . . . was an absorption of East Germany into the
West German system, rather than a marriage of two equal states.’’163 The
reunified government left East Germans feeling ‘‘uninformed . . . and
uninvolved in their new economy.’’164 Furthermore, the East Germans’ lack
of ownership in privatized enterprises encouraged uncertainty and mistrust
toward the new government.165 Dissension concerning the ‘‘foreign’’ western
government prompted East Germans to perceive the new government system
to be illegitimate.166

158. Id. at 1213 n.15.
159. Id.
160. See Frances H. Foster, Restitution of Expropriated Property: Post-Soviet Lessons for
Cuba, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 621, 625-626 (1996).
161. Stack, supra note 16, at 1212 (quoting Matt Marshall, E. Germans Shut Out in Estate
Deals; Privatization Halted for Review by Court, WASHINGTON POST (1995)). The relationship
between East and West has been described as ‘‘divided still by what some call a spiritual and
mental version of the Berlin Wall.’’ Id. at 1212 (quoting Alan Cowell, It’s Young vs. Old in
Germany as the Welfare State Fades, THE NEW YORK TIMES (1997)).
162. Id. at 1212.
163. Maryam Kamali, Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of
Transitional Justice in East Germany and South Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 89, 104
(2001).
164. Stack, supra note 16, at 1228.
165. Id. at 1212-1213.
166. See Bagchi, supra note 140, at 24.
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As part of the reunification process, all East German courts were shut down,
and the ‘‘West German system of specialized courts’’ superseded them.167 West
German judges presided instead of East German judges.168 The rationale behind
this decision was that the East Germans simply did not know West German law
and procedure. The prevalence of West German judges was only supposed to
be provisional, but instead ‘‘[m]any East Berliners . . . began to feel that they
were being ‘colonized by the West . . . .’’’169
Cultural values greatly differed between the two people. ‘‘East Germans
have witnessed Western prosperity and are generally unsatisfied with their
relative situation.’’170 They viewed West Germans as ‘‘foreigners within[,]’’
and ‘‘feelings of animosity . . . have grown and a certain East German
‘nationalism’ has arisen.’’171 Some viewed, and still view, Western democracy
and the unmistakable economic disparity between Easterners and
Westerners as an ‘‘occupation.’’172 East Germans were inundated by the
communist mindset for so long that they naturally mistrusted the western
way of life and government. For example, citizens of two eastern states
thwarted a vote to unite them, mainly because of their mistrust for the
government and frustration over the reunification.173 Citizens cited their
general mistrust of the democratic system as their reason for opposing the
unification.174 They expressed intense frustration toward West German
leaders who made promises of equality between the two groups and failed to
keep those promises. East Germans felt discouraged as a result of the political
and economic division gaping between them and their Western counterparts.
The East German cynicism towards the West German system of
government resembled the legitimacy crises in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Hungary.175 East Germans perceived the role of their party, the policies of
their party, and possibly the Communist Party itself as illegitimate.176 The
167. Kamali, supra note 163, at 109.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Stack, supra note 16, at 1250.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1213 (quoting Dan Van Der Vat, FREEDOM WAS NEVER LIKE THIS, 9 (1991)). East
and West Germans hold deep prejudices against each other. East Germans ‘‘tend to see
westerners as exploiters, and [westerners] . . . regard the east as an unworthy sinkhole for their
tax money.’’ Id. at 1250 (quoting Alan Cowell, Kohl is an Iron Man, But the Price is High, THE
NEW YORK TIMES (1996)).
173. Id. at 1229-1290.
174. Id. at 1230.
175. See Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 187-90.
176. See id. at 189.
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East Germans’ skepticism prevented them from embracing their rights to
own private property and engage in civil politics under the new system. In
spite of all the obstacles, the transition was an overall success.177 East
Germany received freedom of speech, travel, and the right to own property.178
The entire nation experienced an economic boom.179 The United States was
supportive of the reunification.180 Former Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice stated, ‘‘The United States-----and President George H.W. Bush----recognized that Germany had gone through a long democratic
transition. . . . Any issues that had existed in 1945, it seemed perfectly
reasonable to lay them to rest.’’181 While the president did not make a public
statement, he ‘‘never tried in any way to prevent German unification.’’182
Many years have passed since German reunification, and ample discussion
has occurred on the subject. These discussions allow current and future
leaders to analyze the success and failure of the German experience in order
to prepare for a smooth transition. While the Helms-Burton Act was
proposed to stop the communist agenda and support the Cuban nationals’
quest for freedom, the sanctions have not eliminated communism. Rather,
these sanctions have worsened the nationals’ plight. There are two significant
problems still preventing Cuba from making a smooth transition into
democracy: (1) Castro’s administration is still viable, and (2) the HelmsBurton Act prevents Cuba from making any substantive progress.
III. THE PROBLEM
A. The Viability of Castro’s Administration
Fidel understood the value of creating dissension, even within his own
party. In order to ensure that his disastrous legacy continued, Fidel delegated
his authority to a few of his most trusted followers.183 This action ‘‘resulted in
the erosion of trust amongst Castro’s ‘inner circle.’’’184

177. See Feffer, supra note 80.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. Der Spiegel, ‘‘Condoleezza Rice on German Reunification: ‘I Preferred To See It as an
Acquisition’’’ SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
condoleezza-rice-on-german-reunification-i-preferred-to-see-it-as-an-acquisition-a-719444.html.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Espino, supra note 32, at 426-427.
184. Id. at 427.
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[W]hile the Castro government attempts incessantly to portray a
united and strong government, dissention grows in the upper
echelons of the Castro government as Fidel Castro withdraws
from the political scene-----dissention ‘created and fueled by Fidel
himself to prevent alliances [that could] threaten his rule.’185
When Fidel was no longer physically able to lead the Island, his brother
became the ‘‘equivalent of President for life.’’186 While some reports show that
Raúl is redesigning the communist system, these changes have progressed at
a sluggish pace.187 Many believe that true democracy will never be achieved
in Cuba until Castro and the communistic ideology are permanently
dethroned.
B. The United States Responds: The Helms-Burton Act
1. History of the Act
The United States established the Helms-Burton Act in response to a
tempestuous relationship that had developed between the burgeoning Cuban
communists and the United States.188 The United States’ hostile response was
precipitated by the casualties from the Bay of Pigs invasion, the alarming
relationship between Cuba and Russia, and the ‘‘uncompensated
nationalization of American property valued at 1.8 billion dollars.’’189 The
expropriated property is currently valued at over seven billion dollars.190 In
writing this Act, Congress relied on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
the Trading with the Enemy Act to articulate a remedy for restitution of
confiscated property.191 Prior to the establishment of the Helms-Burton Act,
the United States government enforced a number of economic embargos that
were already in place from the Foreign Assistance Act.192
185. Id. at 426.
186. Chriss W. Street, Report: Obama Offers to Lift Cuba Trade Embargo, BREITBART (June
23, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2014/06/23/obama-offers-to-lift-cubatrade-embargo/.
187. Id.
188. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 575-76.
189. Id. at 581-82.
190. Espino, supra note 32, at 435.
191. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 583-85. Congress subsequently altered the embargos via the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979 and
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. Id.
192. Id. at 583; see 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370. Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
proscribes any assistance to Cuba, which included all trade between the United States and
Cuba. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620, 75 Stat. 424 (1961).
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The Helms-Burton Act was introduced in 1995.193 The Clinton
Administration rejected the bill, ‘‘until the February 24, 1996, shootdown of
two unarmed U.S. civilian aircraft over international waters by Cuban
military aircraft resulting in the death of four Cuban-Americans.’’194 As a
result of the incident, the bill quickly passed through the House and the
Senate and was signed by the President.195 The Helms-Burton Act ‘‘take[s]
proactive steps to encourage an early end to the Castro regime’’ and a
transition to a ‘‘democratic process.’’196 Title 1 of the Act ‘‘strengthens the
U.S. embargo against Cuba and calls for the concomitant strengthening of
international sanctions.’’197
The Act proscribed all trade with Cuba. Not a single product, technology
or service from the United States could be exported to Cuba either directly
or through a third party.198 An exception is allowed only for informational
materials and limited humanitarian goods.199 All goods and services of Cuban
origin are prohibited from being imported into the United States either
directly or through a third party.200 This prohibition impacts offshore
transactions as well as every Cuban national who has a product to sell.201
Vessels are banned from carrying goods or passengers to or from Cuba or
even from ‘‘carrying goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has any
interest’’ into a U.S. port.202
Cuban nationals are forbidden from owning property or other assets in
the United States.203 The United States blocks all ‘‘payments, transfers,
withdrawals or other dealings’’ unless the Treasury Department approves
it.204 Additionally, ‘‘travel by U.S. nationals to Cuba is severely restricted.’’205
Until recently, the only groups that were allowed to travel were ‘‘official
government travelers, journalists and persons visiting close relatives in

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Dhooge, supra note 9, at 575.
Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 586.
Id.
Id.
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circumstances of extreme humanitarian need.’’206 ‘‘[H]umanitarian travelers
and persons traveling in connection with specific purposes’’ were allowed to
travel only if they acquired specific licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets
Control.207
The Act states that embargos will only be lifted if the government begins
the process of democratization.208 The legislature intended to use this Act to
protect national security interests of the United States. Lastly, this Act has
language that protects United States citizens from ‘‘confiscation of and
trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro government.’’209 The HelmsBurton Act ‘‘affect[s] all U.S. citizens, permanent residents, persons and
organizations physically located in the United States and branches and
subsidiaries of U.S. organizations located throughout the world.’’210 Violators
of this Act are held accountable and could be imprisoned or have to pay
‘‘corporate and individual fines.’’211
The international community’s reaction to this Act ‘‘was universal,
immediate and unequivocally hostile.’’212 Canada and Mexico complained
that the Act infringed upon the North American Free Trade Agreement,
which guaranteed the free movement of business travelers between the
United States, Canada, and Mexico.213 The European Union argued that the
Act breached the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.214 The majority of Latin American countries filed protests against this
Act.215 Spain and Portugal ‘‘rejected the Act and urged the United States to
reconsider its enforcement.’’216 The United Nations adopted a resolution in
206. Id. (citation omitted).
207. Id. (citation omitted).
208. Id. at 576.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 585.
211. Id. The Act allows the President to suspend its effect ‘‘every six months if the President
deems it necessary to serve national interests of the United States and to expedite Cuba’s
transition to democracy.’’ Id. at 577.
212. Id. at 577.
213. Id. at 577-578. The repercussions of this Act went far beyond simply restricting trade
between the U.S. and Cuba. As a response to the Helms-Burton Act, the Canadian Sugar
Institute wrote a letter to the Canadian Prime Minister expressing its concern that this Act
‘‘would punish Canadian companies that had no relations with Cuba, and would regulate
business activity taking place within Canada.’’ Jonathan R. Ratchik, Cuban Liberty and the
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995, 11 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 343, 354-355 n.73 (1996).
214. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 578.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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November of 1996 ‘‘calling upon the United States to end its economic
embargo against Cuba.’’217 The Vatican also jumped into the conflict ‘‘by
issuing a statement questioning the legality of the Act.’’218
2. How the Helms-Burton Act Affected Cuba
These embargos have had a profound effect on Cuba. For example, the
survival of the Island hinges on the success of its sugar industry.219
Approximately fifty percent of Cuba’s export earnings are derived from
sugar.220 Banning the sugar trade drove Cuba’s economy into a steep
depression, one that impacted the lives of every Cuban national.221 On top of
the economic devastation, the embargos severely restricted communication
between Americans and Cubans.222 Families that were ripped apart due to the
communist takeover were restricted from visiting or even communicating
with their loved ones.223
The lack of communication with the outside world is one reason why the
Island is at a standstill.224 Castro has taken advantage of this by lying to his
people about Americans.225 As they are cut off from the entire outside world,
the Cuban nationals have no other choice but to believe the Communist
propaganda and forfeit any dreams of freedom.226 Instead of pressuring the
Cuban government, the embargos have caused the Cuban people to suffer.227
‘‘Increasingly, the Cuban embargo seems like an outdated way to punish Fidel
Castro when in actuality, the Cuban people are being punished. Economic
policy towards a country of 11 million people needs to be based on more than
a personal vendetta against the Castro family.’’228

Id. at 578-79.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
Id.
Id. at 585.
See id.
See Grider supra note 2, at 461.
See Oppenheimer, supra note 87, at 324.
See id.
Austin Tymins, From the Archives: Reexamining the Cuban Embargo, HARVARD
POLITICAL REVIEW (Dec. 15, 2014, 10:09 PM), http://harvardpolitics.com/world/reexaminingcuban-embargo/.
228. Id.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
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IV. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE HELMS-BURTON ACT IN THE
UNITED STATES
There are a number of legal implications as a result of the Act. Instead of
providing remedies for the victims of the illegal expropriation, this Act places
numerous restrictions on what the legal system can do. American
jurisprudence struggles with the issue of whether Congress delegated
jurisdiction to courts to rule on these issues.229 Cuban nationals and exiles are
unable to obtain justice because American courts have refused to interpret
Congress’s acts. Many of these cases have been dismissed out of the
consternation of overstepping Congressional boundaries.230 ‘‘[C]ourts should
avoid interpreting acts of Congress as violating international law . . . .’’231 The
Helms-Burton Act limits courts from seeking justice for the Cuban
Americans who are victims of Castro’s expropriation and prevents them
from obtaining remedies.
V. THE SOLUTION
The ultimate Cuban dream is to create a democratic state purged of radical
tenets and welcoming reunification between the nationals and exiles. While
Cuba’s story is distinct from the German experience, it is prudent to analyze
the German democratization process and apply the principles that were
successful while preparing to overcome the ideas that failed. Germans faced
various challenges as a result of the reunification. Some of these included the
partition between the western and eastern people and the masses and the
elites. Moreover, the pace of the transition and the information provided to
the East Germans caused a general feeling of distrust and skepticism towards
the new government.232

229. Some of these questions surround the applicability of the Act of State doctrine. While
the Act of State doctrine is not an international law principle, it is accepted that American
courts ‘‘will not pass on the validity of the acts of foreign governments performed in their
capacities as sovereigns within their own territories.’’ Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
307 F.2d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1962), rev’d on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
230. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967). The court chose to
apply the Hickenlooper Amendment that allowed ‘‘cases arising out of foreign expropriations
to be decided on the merits (unless of course the Executive Branch . . . intervene[s]).’’ Id. at
180. Even though ‘‘[t]he president could have vetoed the measure if felt it seriously threatened
his freedom of action in the conduct of foreign affairs but he chose not do so.’’ Id. at 182-83.
231. Ratchik, supra note 213, at 363 n.118.
232. Stack, supra note 16, at 1249-50.
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A. The Challenges Faced When Uniting Two Groups who are Culturally
Similar but Have Irreconcilable Experiences
1. Germany Reunified: West and East Germans
West Germans were perceived as a ‘‘wealthy class of individuals who . . .
c[a]me in and took all the best properties through their property claims and
demand[ed] restitution.’’233 In fact, in the 1990s, ‘‘only 21 percent of
Easterners believe[d] the slogan ‘We are one people’ to be true. Instead,
seventy percent [were] of the opinion that they [were] treated as ‘second-class
Germans.’’’234 ‘‘Westerners dominate[d] within the parties, the ministries, the
courts, the bureaucracies and in the interest groups.’’235 Thus, it was not
surprising that communist groups resurfaced in eastern zones. During the
time when the reunified government implemented privatization and
restitution, the unrest was infectious. East Germans mistrusted their western
brothers and endeavored to revert back to a communist society.236
2. The Cuban Diaspora: Cuban Nationals and Cuban Exiles
Initially, when Fidel Castro ‘‘liberated’’ the Island from absolute rule,
Cubans followed his revolutionary notions. When Fidel launched his
campaign against capitalism and began stealing freedoms, the Cuban people
fought back. The government reacted harshly towards the insurgents. Some
were imprisoned, some were executed, and many others escaped to
neighboring nations.237 Nearly one million exiles escaped from Cuba and a
diaspora transpired.238 Cuban exiles escaped for many of the same reasons
East Germans escaped to the west side of the Berlin Wall. As a percentage of
population, however, more Cubans escaped from Cuba than Germans

233. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW & DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
REPORT ON THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING PROPERTY CLAIMS BETWEEN CUBA & THE UNITED
STATES 87 (Creighton University Press, 2007).
234. JENNIFER A. YODER, FROM EAST GERMANS TO GERMANS? THE NEW POSTCOMMUNIST
ELITES 204 (Duke University Press 1999).
235. Kamali, supra note 163 at 110 n.67 (2001-2002) (quotation omitted).
236. Stack, supra note 16, at 1249-50.
237. Organización de Los Estados Americanos, supra note 4.
238. Grider, supra note 2, at 464 (‘‘Unlike other exile communities that suffered from
diaspora, the Cuban exile community has remained comparatively intact, concentrated
primarily in one country in only two geographic regions, greater Miami and New Jersey. Many
in the community remain focused on events in Cuba.’’); Antonio R. Zamora, Real Estate
Development in Cuba: Present and Future, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 605, 609 (2009).
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escaped from East Germany.239 The majority of Cuban exiles are anti-Castro,
while the average Cuban national ‘‘remains surprisingly loyal to the
Revolution.’’240 In fact, it is the result of the anti-Castro inclination that, until
recently, persuaded the United States policies against Cuba.241 Unlike exiles
in Germany, ‘‘the Cuban-American community has assimilated less than
many other . . . exile groups . . . .’’242
In the same way that the East Germans perceived the West Germans as
threatening towards their lifestyle, the Cuban nationals feel threatened by the
Cuban exile community.243 Notwithstanding the fact that both Cuban exiles
and nationals desire their island to revert back to a free society, there exists a
great deal of friction.244 Cuban exiles possess a ‘‘position of strength and
bargaining power’’ that nationals do not possess.245 Exile communities are
wealthier and more affluent compared to their national brothers.246 Even in
Cuba, the majority of individuals who escaped the island already had the
necessary financial resources.247 At the time of Castro’s rise to power, racism
was a constant problem.248 As evidence, the wealthy and affluent exiles are
predominantly Caucasian, while the nationals, still on the Island, are chiefly
from ‘‘African or mixed ancestry.’’249 Any remaining Cuban nationals with
influence are those in the Communist Party. Since the diaspora, the
economic gap between the exiles and the nationals has grown.250 Exiles living
in the United States have worked diligently and experienced considerable
success.251 Meanwhile, the individuals living on the Island have lost hope of
ever seeing the fruits of their labor.252

239. See Grider, supra note 2, at 464. At least ten percent of Cubans left their homeland
for political and economic reasons as opposed to a much smaller percentage of Eastern
Europeans. Id.
240. Id. at 462, 464.
241. Id. at 464-65.
242. Id. at 464.
243. Creighton, supra note 233, at 87.
244. Grider, supra note 2, at 464.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 465.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 464.
251. Id.
252. See Sotolongo Interview, supra note 79, at 1.
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In addition to the racial tension and inequalities, there exists a
psychological divide between the exile and national communities. Similar to
the divide between Eastern and Western Germans, Cuban exiles view the
nationals’ loyalty to Castro as treasonous.253 Conversely, Cuban nationals feel
apprehensive and suspicious about the exile community.254 The Cuban
government has taken advantage of the public’s anxiety. In a radio broadcast
to the Island, Castro warned the Cuban people that, ‘‘in Miami, they are
already parceling out our country, and dreaming of getting everything back,
but that won’t happen as long as there remains one single man or woman
with a sense of dignity.’’255 The nationals fear the idea of the exiles returning
and prioritizing their interests to the detriment of their countrymen’s
interests. Even though transition has not yet occurred, the nationals already
feel entrapped and harbor distrust towards the exiles and the American way
of life.256 Such feelings of distrust are strikingly similar to what the Eastern
Germans felt towards the West Germans.
3. Understanding the Roles and Relationship Between the Cuban
Masses and the Cuban Elites
Transition is impacted by the strength of the people, both the masses and
the elites.257 Nations that have successfully transitioned from one type of
government to another have faced issues involving both mass mobilization
and political elites.258 Both groups have a direct impact on the constitutional
drafting and implementation processes. Understanding the roles and
relationships between these groups is crucial to a successful transition. ‘‘The
masses serve as the spark for a transition. . . . [R]evolutions result where the
masses can trigger a transition through the use of force.’’259 Elites also play a
significant role in a governmental transition. ‘‘[E]lite consent for this
particular form of political change is absolutely necessary and, in some
instances, sufficient for the long-term success of democracy.’’260 Any
transition Cuba makes from Communism toward Democracy ‘‘will likely
arise when the [elite] members . . . see a free market democracy as a valid and
253. Grider, supra note 2, at 466.
254. Id. at 467
255. Oppenheimmer, supra note 87, at 324 (citing Fidel Castro, Address to National
Assembly, Sept. 26, 1960).
256. Grider, supra note 2, at 467.
257. Creighton, supra note 233, at 24-25.
258. Id. at 23.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 25.
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advantageous alternative to their current situation.’’261 Constitutional politics
‘‘are influenced . . . by constraints and opportunities facing political elites, the
level of popular mobilization, and ‘regional contagion’ effects.’’262 This was
true in Germany as well. ‘‘After the fall of the communist regime in East
Germany, there were few viable alternatives and the voluntary election by
East Germans to join [West] Germany legitimated the incorporation
process.’’263 Some historians argue that the negative experience East Germans
had with democratization came as a result of the accelerated speed of the
transition.264
Communism naturally prompts a contrasting divide between the rich and
the poor. As a result of restricted contact with Cuban nationals, little is
known regarding the specific relationship amongst the classes inside of
Cuba.265 What is clear, however, is that Communism creates a sharp line
between those with privileges and those without hope. The average Cuban
national faces a permanent glass ceiling because they are restricted from any
opportunities to better themselves.266 ‘‘[M]any people who otherwise would
do higher learning instead spend that energy leaving the country.’’267 The
intense situation present on the Island ‘‘may produce a reaction within Cuba
for change.’’268 Cuba’s civil society is currently weak because it has been a
‘‘hermetically sealed society’’ for the last fifty years.269 Arguably,
[w]hile the masses may play a role in provoking or exacerbating a
crisis of legitimacy on the island, they are not as likely to play as
important a role as members of the elite in dismantling of the
current regime-----primarily because of the general weakness of
civil society in Cuba.270
261. Espino, supra note 32, at 427. However, it is axiomatic that if forced to make a
decision, the elites will choose to remain loyal because they were ‘‘brought up through the
ranks thanks to Fidel or Raúl Castro . . . their fates [are] tied to a continuity of policies that
favor them.’’ Creighton, supra note 233, at 26.
262. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1235-36.
263. Kamali, supra note 163, at 109 n.67.
264. Stack, supra note 16, at 1235.
265. Creighton, supra note 233, at 28.
266. See Sotolongo Interview, supra note 79, at 1.
267. Id.
268. Creighton, supra note 233, at 28.
269. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Year-End Press Conference, THE WHITE
HOUSE
(Dec.
19,
2014,
1:53
PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/12/19/remarks-president-year-end-press-conference.
270. Creighton, supra note 233, at 28.
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The elites owe their position to their relationship with Castro’s
administration.271 Even if they desire a democratic nation, the elites fear they
would risk everything by speaking against the regime.272 Nevertheless, if any
permanent change were to occur on the Island, it would have to be as a result
of changes implemented by the wealthy elites and supported by mass
mobilization.
B. Choosing the Best Speed for the Transition and the Most Effective
Remedy for Restitution is Critical for a Successful Transition
Analysts scrutinize history to understand the process by which a nation
transitions from one form of government to another. Often, nations in the
process of transitioning eliminate one extreme ideology only to implement
its rival.273 These transitions may be characterized, scrutinized, and
formulized by a variety of methods. The speed of the transition and the type
of remedy the government offers injured parties plays a crucial role in
preparing for a smooth transition.
1. The Speed for the Transition
Privatization is the process by which property, formerly nationalized, is
returned to the people. The speed by which the government chooses to
transition both directly and indirectly affects its success. Historically, nations
have employed a variety of timetables. A government may implement
privatization gradually or rapidly.274 A progressive transition is known as a
‘‘gradualist process’’ and its antithesis, which occurs rapidly, has been
referred to as ‘‘shock therapy.’’275
a. The Gradualist Process
Gradual privatization is often used ‘‘in countries that seek to retain a
centrally planned economic system.’’276 The purpose of this method is to
slowly implement a full transformation.277 A gradualist method allows a new
271. Feldman Interview, supra note 35, at 1.
272. Id.
273. See Section B for a discussion of East Germany’s transition from communism to
democracy.
274. Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 1001, 1004.
275. Creighton, supra note 233, at 91. Other types of transitions include the Russian
implementation of the neoclassical theory and the generic big bang approach. These
discussions go beyond the scope of this comment. Id. at 92.
276. Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 1004.
277. Grider, supra note 2, at 460.
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economy to be paralleled with the old.278 ‘‘[A] ‘gradualist’ approach to
privatization is the only feasible solution as it allows the development of a
market economy that incorporates the socio-cultural and sociopsychological order of the country.’’279 ‘‘Asset values should be permitted to
reflect the declining political risk and improving business climate before
these companies are sold.’’280 Under a gradual transition, Cubans will have
the opportunity to reap the value of their property to avoid ‘‘seeing them
squandered in hard currency sales to foreign speculators.’’281
Supporters of a gradual method recognize the need for actual owners who
have a ‘‘long term view’’ as this encourages a ‘‘strong measure of control.’’282
Gradualists fear that a rapid transition would cause ‘‘danger of severe
economic dislocation if too much change is attempted quickly.’’283
Additionally, some scholars, such as prominent exile Antonio Jorge, argue
that a gradualist transition is preferred to avoid the political and social
tensions that accompany a quick transition.284
b. Shock Therapy
The antithetical approach to a slow and gradual change is rapid reform.285
Ideally, shock therapy would involve a ‘‘full range of reforms including:
macroeconomic stabilization, price liberalization, currency convertibility,
trade and banking reformation, labor deregulation, privatization, and legal
and social reformation, [enacted] simultaneously and as quickly as
possible.’’286 Proponents of a gradual process argue that the historical
278. Hendrix, supra note 33, at 96 (citing Hearings before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures and the Subcomm. on Trade House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong. 314, 29
(1994) (statement of Irene Philippi, Senior Economist, Polyconomics, Inc.) (‘‘Hearing’’)).
279. Grider, supra note 2, at 460 (citing Antonio Jorge, Small, Developing Economies in
Transition: Prospects for Post-Castro Cuba, in CUBA’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: LESSONS
FROM THE FORMER SOVIET BLOC 92, 92-103 (Adolfo Leyva ed., 1992)).
280. Hendrix, supra note 33, at 96.
281. Id.
282. Stanley Fischer & Alan Gelb, The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation, 5 J. OF
ECON. PERSP. 91, 91 (1991), http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.5.4.91.
283. Id. at 98.
284. Grider, supra note 2, at 460.
285. The former Polish Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz described the benefits of
employing a shock method during a ‘‘period of extraordinary politics.’’ Mills & Koslosky, supra
note 12, at 1244 n.162. He said, ‘‘[t]his ‘special state of mass psychology’ is one whereby the
public is more willing to make personal sacrifices for the greater good when foreign
domination ends or domestic political liberalization occurs.’’ Id. Utilizing a rapid transition
secures reform and avoids the otherwise high likelihood of complications. Id.
286. Creighton, supra note 233, at 91.
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repercussions of rapid transition has often produced ‘‘mass public opposition
and dissonance amongst the elite, complicating economic transition even
more and possibly delaying further needed reforms.’’287
Rapid transitions, however, are best used during a ‘‘period of
extraordinary politics.’’288 Leaders utilize shock therapy to ensure that ‘‘the
public is more willing to make personal sacrifices for the greater good . . . .’’289
Examples of scenarios involving ‘‘extraordinary politics’’ include the end of
foreign control or the beginning of a democratic system. The merger of East
and West Germany was what some analysts describe as a successful example
of shock therapy. ‘‘German leaders seized the opportunity created by the fall
of Communism to make extraordinary changes, and the two Germanies were
politically and economically unified in one swift motion.’’290 Both sovereigns
signed the Treaty of Unification, which infused the democratic political
processes of the west into the east zones. An additional treaty was set in place
to launch a marriage of economies.291 A market economy was created that
‘‘operate[d] on principles of private ownership and competition driven by
free pricing and the free movement of labor, capital, goods, and services.’’292
These treaties also allowed for the unifying of the currency.293
Nevertheless, the dislocation that occurs when property is privatized
before a market exists and before a stable process is established is inherently
dangerous and sometimes fatal to a fledgling country.294 The treaties both

287. Id.
288. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1244 n.162 (quoting LESZEK BALCEROWICZ,
SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM, TRANSFORMATION 146, 160-61 (1995)). Shock therapy is also beneficial
and arguably necessary in a situation of ‘‘macroeconomic instability.’’ Id. Moreover, ‘‘fast
privatizers argue that the benefits of a rapid and irreversible shift to private production
outweigh the costs of reduced state revenue.’’ Fischer & Gelb, supra note 282, at 99.
289. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1244 n.162.
290. Stack, supra note 16, at 1215.
291. Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion (Treaty
on the Monetary, Economic and Social Union), German Democratic Republic-Federal
Republic of Germany, May 18, 1990.
292. Frank, supra note 144, at 818. Poland was another nation that successfully utilized a
shock method. The Polish government created a market economy through the immediate
privatization of formerly stated owned assets without the prior construction of a market
infrastructure. Grider, supra note 2, at 459. Poland effectuated shock therapy in
‘‘macrostabilization, convertible currency, and privatizations . . . alongside further political
reforms.’’ Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1244.
293. The West German Mark became the currency of both lands while the East German
currency was invalidated.
294. See Grider, supra note 2, at 460.
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Germanies signed caused a shock to the economy.295 In order for that
government to fulfill its goal of privatizing quickly, it ‘‘disassembled many
enterprises and cut out the overemployment typical of the communist
system, which led to high unemployment rates and disenchantment with the
new market system.’’296 Jobs were drastically cut and East Germans had
almost no ownership in the newly privatized enterprises.297
Likewise, the East Germans were not prepared for the shock of a new
economic system. As one observer noted, the ‘‘morale and attitudes of the
[East German] people are almost beyond repair.’’298 Some critics maintain
that the ‘‘the psychological scars displayed by the East Germans are so deep .
. . that they have put the east into a worse position-----for all its newfound
economic potential-----than Eastern Europe’s other former Communist
states.’’299 Thus far, shock therapy in European nations has proven to
‘‘exacerbate[] the dislocations inherent in the transformation process.’’300 If
not done correctly, rapid transitions can generate instability and mistrust
between a citizenry and its vulnerable government.301
2. The Spectrum of Remedial Possibilities
Former socialistic and communistic nations have taken measures to
restore property expropriated by the state. Legislators recognize that their
ultimate goal in enforcing restitution is to ensure that ‘‘establishing historical
juridical justice will [not] beget new injustice.’’302 ‘‘Restitution [of property] is
‘the natural law’ and should be the general rule with respect to previous
295. Stack, supra note 16, at 1234-35.
296. Id. at 1234-35.
297. Id. at 1238. As hindsight is always 20/20, analysts now offer a variety of suggestions
that might have eased the awkward transition of communist East Germany into a democratic
system. Some suggest that a ‘‘better strategy would have been ‘to subsidise unnecessary jobs
temporarily [rather] than to support large numbers of unemployed in east Germany’. . . Easing
people out of employment more gradually would have allowed more time for adjustment.
Also, warning the East Germans in advance would have helped them to prepare.’’ Id. at 1235
(quoting Judy Dempsey, No Work, Little to Believe in: Popular Pressure for Politicians to Find
Solutions to East German Unemployment, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at 17).
298. Stack, supra note 16, at 1238.
299. Id. (quoting Mary Williams Walsh, National Agenda: Going Private------the Profit and
the Pain, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 1995) at H1).
300. Grider, supra note 2, at 460.
301. David Stark, Path Dependency and Privatization Strategies in East-Central Europe, 6
E. EUR. POL. & SOC’YS 11, 35-38 (1992). Rapid transitions do not allow for flexibility for the
differing traditions or respect for the varying cultures present.
302. Foster, supra note 160, at 651 (quoting Arvo Junti, cited in Radio Tallinn Network,
June 13, 1991, translated in F.B.I.S.- SOV, June 14, 1991, at 41).
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confiscation of private property.’’303 A number of these nations experimented
with various forms of privatization, thus producing a spectrum of
possibilities for restitution.304 Natural restitution and monetary
compensation are the most effective remedies.305
a. Natural Restitution
The concept of privatization is the process by which property, illegally
expropriated by the state, is reverted back into private hands.306 Some analysts
view the process of privatization as a natural result of a nation attempting to
move past its communistic roots.307 One of the goals of privatization is ‘‘the
equitable redistribution of property rights.’’308 Stripping property out of the
hands of a small group of elites and transferring it back to the public can
arguably assist a transitional government in breaking its ties to the former
government.309 Natural restitution is a term that ‘‘refers to [the] return of the
actual property expropriated during the communist era.’’310
Historians and analysts supporting restitution of property have found
three rationales for natural restitution. First, restitution promotes rapid and
efficient transition to a market economy by transferring state and collective
property to private owners.311 Simultaneously, restitution ‘‘‘restor[es] the
value of property’ in the minds of citizens.’’312 Second, analysts argue that
restitution ‘‘is ‘morally the right thing to do’ to remedy past [wrongs].’’313
Third, restitution ‘‘serves ‘as a vehicle for the construction of postcommunist national identity.’’’314
However, the sovereigns that deployed a mass privatization, which
involved natural restitution, faced concerns that these actions ‘‘would
interfere with the country’s advanced privatization process, jeopardize

303. Freer, supra note 13, at 192. ‘‘The issue of privatization in Cuba is closely intertwined
with the resolution of claims for compensation or restitution by property owners who suffered
expropriation by the Cuban government.’’ Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 195.
304. Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 193.
305. Id. at 189-90.
306. Grider, supra note 2, at 456-58.
307. Gelpern, supra note 11, at 370-71.
308. Grider, supra note 2, at 456.
309. Id.
310. Foster, supra note 160, at 633-34.
311. Id. at 626.
312. Id. (quoting Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar).
313. Id. (citation omitted).
314. Id. (citation omitted).
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foreign investment, and increase the foreign debt which was already the
highest in the region.’’315 The two German governments opted to restore
stolen property to its former owners.316 East Germany’s experience with
natural restitution demonstrated the difficulty of transitioning property
rights from state controlled to a privatized system.317
The Marxist philosophy that dominated East Germany held that ‘‘private
ownership of the means of production, including property, is the primary
means of oppression.’’318 This ideology derived from the Communist
Manifesto, in which Karl Marx wrote, ‘‘[Communism] may be summed up
in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.’’319 East Germans were
responsible for the property they lived on and farms they operated.320 Yet,
these responsibilities did not constitute legal property ownership.321
In reunited Germany, privatization took the form of sale of property and
restitution of expropriated property.322 The first step Germany took was to
create a Trust Agency that assumed ownership of all state-owned enterprises
and then privatized them by sale to investors.323 This idea proved to be
difficult and slow as claims poured in and overwhelmed the Agency. ‘‘[I]n
many instances, the law favored a current property holder over a restitution
claimant.’’324 This, along with the fact that most East Germans lacked
ownership,325 caused an unbelievable number of complications,326 thus
resulting in East Germans’ frustration and mistrust of the democratic
government.327 ‘‘East Germans . . . reacted to privatization with feelings of
disbelief and betrayal. Many East Germans believed that the [Trust Agency]
sold off property as quickly as it could, paying little attention to the effect it
would have on life in East Germany.’’328
315. Gelpern, supra note 11, at 371.
316. Jeffress, supra note 149, at 528.
317. Id. at 529-30.
318. Id. at 530.
319. MARX & ENGELS, supra note 3, at 27.
320. Jeffress, supra note 149, at 531.
321. Id.
322. Stack, supra note 16, at 1218.
323. Id. The Trust Agency is known as the ‘‘Treuhand.’’ Id.
324. Id. at 1226.
325. Id. at 1237.
326. Id. at 1230.
327. Id. at 1212.
328. Id. at 1228-29. Germany’s restitution program was only successful because of West
Germany’s strong economy and previously established system. No other Eastern European
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b. Monetary Compensation
Compensation is yet another method to provide a remedy to jilted
property owners. Many European restitution systems ‘‘guarantee
‘compensation’ to former owners who decline other forms of restitution
and/or are ineligible to receive natural restitution.’’329 In cases where
restitution is not available, ‘‘where current holders of the property are exempt
from claims under the laws . . . or where the property serves exempted public
purposes,’’ compensation becomes the remedy of choice.330
In cases that required monetary compensation, the state paid ‘‘a lump sum
to itself based on some percentage of the overall estimated total value of the
claims, and then pa[id them] out in the form of benefits to its citizen
claimants.’’331 ‘‘[C]ompensation strategies are usually far easier to expedite
than is restitution and can take into account the political interests of a
transitional regime in avoiding alienating populations fearful of losing their
homes or jobs.’’332 In Germany, the Trust Agency first attempted to provide
in-kind compensation. However, when approximately 1.2 million claims
were filed, compensation was seen as too expensive.333 Germany continued
to use it ‘‘in the case[s] of good faith purchasers, property used for residential
purposes that [were] currently occupied, property dedicated to the public
interest, and property involving a joint commercial enterprise.’’334
In Cuba’s case, a pure monetary compensation strategy may not be the
most effective remedy. ‘‘Domestically, the Cuban treasury is drained, the
resources of the citizens are nominal, and the government is on the verge of
bankruptcy.’’335 ‘‘A transitional government in Havana . . . is not liable to have
access to adequate financial resources to pay compensation.’’336 Thus, unless
the Island’s economy drastically improves, compensation cannot be the
primary remedy for expropriated property.
country had a structure similar to Germany. In Cuba’s scenario the only party with the
necessary ‘‘financial and administrative resources’’ is the United States. Grider, supra note 2,
at 489. However, the United States does ‘‘not have the political legitimacy, much less [the]
domestic mandate, to do so. It is therefore beyond hope that a restitution program as extensive
as the German program could be replicated in Cuba.’’ Id.
329. Foster, supra note 160, at 635.
330. Gelpern, supra note 11, at 338. Examples of rationales to exempt property from
privatization include public health and recreation, natural reserves or national heritage. Id.
331. Creighton, supra note 233, at 73.
332. Id. at 89.
333. Id. at 86.
334. Id.
335. Freer, supra note 13, at 187.
336. Creighton, supra note 233, at 78.
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Natural restitution may be the Island’s remedy of choice, as it allows for a
decisive break from the previous regime, while compensation does not. 337
Compensation strategies are likely to be more costly than natural
restitution.338 Natural restitution establishes the priority and validity of
property rights and provides a clear title for owners while compensation
opens the question of who eventually gain control of the contested
property.339 Generally, compensation340 is paid at a small percentage of any
value that might be placed on the property, while natural restitution tends to
stimulate markets, thus affecting higher economic efficiency.341 Since both
strategies pose problems, a balanced combination of the two strategies might
be the best solution.342 At the very least, ‘‘restitution should be the rule and
compensation should be the exception.’’343
3. Cuba’s Best Choice
Fidel Castro’s administration took every opportunity to expropriate
property from innocent Cubans. The three main justifications for these illegal
actions were as follows:
(1) Expropriation of . . . land, industries, and businesses for
economic reform purposes; (2) confiscation of property from
alleged . . . individuals and corporate entities found ‘‘liable for
offenses against the national economy or public treasury;’’ and (3)
seizure of property ‘‘voluntarily’’ ‘‘abandoned’’ by Cuban citizens
who travelled abroad and failed to return within a specified time
period.344

337. Id. at 88-89.
338. Id. at 89. For the same reasons, compensation strategies may be more costly than
substitutionary restitution.
339. Id. at 88-89.
340. Regarding compensation for Cuban exiles, many have received compensation for
their property losses ‘‘by the American government, which allowed exiles meeting specific tests
both business and personal federal income tax deductions for property seized by the Cuban
government.’’ Grider, supra note 2, at 493.
341. Creighton, supra note 233, at 88-89.
342. Id. at 89.
343. Freer, supra note 13, at 190. ‘‘Compensation will probably need to be paid for
residential, small commercial, and agrarian properties to avoid social and political dislocation
and discontent, and to avoid lengthy and costly legal deliberations.’’ Creighton, supra note 233,
at 89.
344. Foster, supra note 160, at 651 (quotation omitted).
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‘‘With the rapid deterioration of the Cuban economy and rising
international concern, resolution of this issue has become a matter of great
urgency.’’345 Economic analysts argue that it is in Cuba’s best interest to enact
‘‘a rapid macroeconomic change to a market economy.’’346 This system, while
needed to ensure restitution to or compensation of former owners, must also
encourage long-term investment commitments.347 Such an environment
would prevent capital depletion or a destabilization of economic markets.348
Thus, shock therapy is the best choice for speed.
As for a remedy, restitution of Cuban property is not only the most
effective remedy, but also has powerful symbolic value, as it would mark the
rise of a new era.349 Such a symbol ‘‘would provide a moral as well as legal
condemnation of the past’’ and thus ‘‘establish legitimacy in the eyes of the
world community.’’350 An added benefit to a natural restitution process is that
it has the potential to accelerate the restoration of ties between Cuba and the
United States.351
C. The United States’ Role in Cuba’s Tomorrow
The first question to address is whether the United States should get
involved in the Cuban situation. The answer to this question would be more
complex if the United States wasn’t already involved. However, the United
States has already intervened in Cuban affairs by enacting embargos with the
345. Id. at 623-24.
346. Freer, supra note 13, at 204.
347. Id. at 205.
348. Id.; Espino, supra note 32, at 436.
349. Foster, supra note 160, at 649.
350. Id.
351. Id. Substitutional restitution is a remedy afforded to a former owner when either total
or partial return of the actual property is not possible. Cases that require substitutionary
restitution occur in situations ‘‘where the claimant’s property no longer exists in its original
form or is formally excluded from the natural restitution process.’’ Id. at 635. In these
situations, restitution comes in the form of ‘‘replacement property’’ that is equivalent to the
property illegally expropriated. Id. One kind of substitutional restitution is known as voucher
privatization. These vouchers are awarded in situations ‘‘where people owned land the
government was unwilling or unable to return or where owners themselves did not claim
actual or substitutional restitution.’’ Id. at 644. Some analysts argue that because of Cuba’s ‘‘low
monetary reserves,’’ the Island is a prime candidate for this approach. Id. at 655. These analysts
argue that such a system ‘‘would speed enterprise restructuring and privatization and preserve
Cuba’s limited assets and resources for investment in national modernization rather than
settlement of outstanding restitution and compensation claims.’’ Id. at 655-56. Inversely,
because of Cuba’s uncertain future, it is unlikely that former owners will be satisfied by this
remedy. Id. at 656.
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romantic hopes that the Communist Party would surrender. This fantasy has
had a harrowing effect on Cuban nationals, who have suffered for over fifty
years. Historically, embargos have caused more harm than actual progress
towards freedom.352 Due to the United States’ history of imposing embargos,
the United States has the responsibility to make some changes in its policy
that would further the interests of the Cuban people.
Obtaining freedom for Cubans while retaining the trust of nationals is a
delicate but crucial process. Exiles need the opportunity to express their
ideology and nationals need the opportunity to hear and understand their
Cuban brothers. In order to do this, the United States must lift the embargos
that limit communication and travel on both sides, thus allowing
information to reach Cuban nationals. Permitting exiles to build
relationships with nationals will prevent the difficult situation that occurred
in Germany, and allow for a smoother transition. Additionally, authorizing
importation of technology will aid nationals in their quest to understand the
dangers of communism and the benefits of democracy.
In April 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced his plan to ease
restrictions on travel and remittances to the Island by Cuban-Americans, but
the U.S. trade embargo remains.353 In the official White House
Memorandum, the President recognized that promoting communication
between Cuban-Americans and their relatives, as well as ‘‘increasing the flow
of remittances and information’’ is vital to ‘‘decrease dependency of the
Cuban people on the Castro regime . . . .’’354 The President’s order authorized
and licensed U.S. telecommunication service providers, as well as satellite,
radio, and television service providers, to link with and engage in
transactions in Cuba.355 The order authorized the export of ‘‘mobile phone
systems, computers and software, and satellite receivers’’ to Cuba.356
Additionally, the ban on humanitarian exports was removed. The order
allowed for donations of ‘‘clothing, personal hygiene items, seeds, veterinary
medicines and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, and soap-making
equipment’’ for humanitarian needs.357
352. See generally Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12.
353. Memorandum from the White House Office of Press Secretary to the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce, Promoting Democracy
and
Human
Rights
in
Cuba,
paras.
(a)-(b)
(Apr.
13,
2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memorandum-Promoting-Democracy-andHuman-Rights-in-Cuba/.
354. Id. at para. 1.
355. Id. at paras. (c)-(e).
356. Id. at para. (g).
357. Id. at para. (h).
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The President’s executive order triggered a debate as to whether he
overstepped his authority by avoiding the Act’s restrictions.358 No one expects
Raúl or any Cuban leader to swiftly transition from one style of government
to another. President Obama is simply responding to Raúl’s gradual policy
changes.359 The executive order combined with Raúl’s decision to allow more
access to the internet enables Cubans to communicate with the outside world
and receive necessary humanitarian aid. The opportunity to obtain
information is the first step in completely transforming the Cuban way of life.
On December 17, 2014, President Obama and his administration released
a proposal creating a new plan for Cuba.360 Thus began the first conversation
between the leaders of the United States and Cuba since the 1959 Cuban
Revolution.361 The Obama administration described the decision by stating
that ‘‘President Obama is taking action to cut loose the anchor of failed
policies of the past, and to chart a new course in U.S. relations with Cuba that
will engage and empower the Cuban people.’’362 In response, ‘‘President Raúl
Castro . . . thank[ed] President Obama for ‘a new chapter’ while also
reaffirming that restored relations with the United States did not mean the
end of communist rule in Cuba.’’363 The gradual implementation of these
changes, if done correctly, can empower the Cuban nationals to fight for their
freedom.
IV. CONCLUSION
Change is inevitable for Cuba. The United States should support Cuba as
it did Germany. The United States supported the German reunification as
well as the democratization of Eastern Germany even though the United
States did not take an active role in Germany’s democratization. Unlike the

358. Street, supra note 186.
359. Id.
360. Memorandum from the White House, Charting a New Course on Cuba (Dec. 17,
2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba. The above link contains the
key components and details of the President’s updated policy approach towards Cuba.
361. See ABC NEWS, Obama Describes ‘Substantive,’ Blunt conversation with Raul Castro
(Dec. 17, 2014, 6:43 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obama-describes-substantive-blunt-conversation-cubasraul-castro/story?id=27669012
362. Memorandum from the White House, supra note 360 (emphasis added).
363. Damien Cave, Raúl Castro Thanks U.S., but Reaffirms Communist Rule in Cuba, The
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Dec.
20,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/americas/castro-thanks-us-but-affirms-cubascommunist-rule.html?_r=0.
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passive role the United States took with Germany, the United States chose to
take an active role by sanctioning Cuba’s communist regime. The sanctions
the United States imposed have harmed nationals, rather than protected. For
this reason, the United States has a duty to change course. If done properly,
President Obama’s decision to restore relations may provide nationals with
the support they need to overturn the communist regime. While these
changes are exciting, the United States must carefully weigh the possibility
that this newfound relationship may further solidify Castro’s communism,
and thus further hurt the Cuban people.
When Cuba embarks on its transition from communism to a free society,
its leaders must show their commitment to legitimize the government and to
protect private property rights. This commitment can manifest itself in the
form of privatization and remedies for individuals and corporations with
expropriated property. Privatization is a tricky process and success can only
be achieved when ‘‘people accept, understand, and participate in the resulting
market economy and where political stability thereby remains.’’364
Germany had the ideal situation; the governmental system did not need to
be recreated. The two nations simply merged and implemented the alreadyestablished Western structure. Despite these ideal circumstances,
transformation in Germany was arduous. A more gradual process, with
Western Germans educating East Germans, would have provided East
Germans with a smoother transition. Unlike the East Germans’ experience,
Cuban nationals will have to construct a Cuban democratic system from the
ground up. Democratizing gradually would provide Cuban nationals time to
adjust, allow the economy to develop, as well as incorporate the sociocultural and socio-psychological aspects of the Island.365
Regarding a remedy, natural restitution is the best choice for resolving
claims of property expropriation. The Cuban administration, responsible for
prioritizing claims, should emphasize claims from nationals rather than
those of exiles. If factors exist that impede natural restitution, then
appropriate authorities should be given the jurisdiction to turn to other
remedies. These remedies would consist of either allocating other properties
to serve as a substitute for restitution or monetary compensation.
Cuba’s future is in the hands of Cuban nationals, exiles, and the United
States government. Although predicting the Island’s fate is impossible, it is
possible to appreciate that all Cubans desire peace and prosperity for their

364. Stack, supra note 16, at 1239.
365. Espino, supra note 32, at 424.
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home. Ultimately, ‘‘the strength of the human spirit and the character of the
Cuban people’’ will determine Cuba’s future.366

366. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1270.

